5 intensity, proceeding then to his notion of daimon, as equated by Hegel with individual intensive 'nucleus' of the soul. After that, I will examine Hegel's anthropological notion of fate as directing an individual towards his own 'sphere' within the spiritual res publica, through which Absolute Spirit, as Hegel characteristically puts it, 'comes to itself'.
Along the way, other related themes will be discussed, such as the 'emptiness' of the animal soul, the divine 'play' of Absolute Spirit in the human realm as contrasted with its mere 'frolicking' in nature, the notion of 'measure' of the soul's intensity, or 'measure of Genius', and Hegel's conceptualization of personal death in terms of its destruction, the correlation between the 'scale' (Maßstab) of one's soul and the 'scale' of one's individual world of experience, the relation between the principle of fate and the principle of consolation in Hegel, as well as one's free -not 'blind' -participation in the Gemeinwesen as 'the work of the world' ('das Werk der Welt').
The soul's intensity and fate are in Hegel, so to speak, the individual anthropological characteristics of what he calls the 'play of Absolute Spirit with itself', as realized, individually, through every human soul and, cooperatively, through the free res publica of spirit. It is not as if Absolute Spirit is playing 'above' the heads of individuals. Quite the contrary: individual souls inherently possess these characteristics as that which allows each human being to realize his own, 'inner' spiritual goals, through which, at the same time, the universal 'work of the world' is being accomplished. Every human individual, distinguished from the animal by the spiritual determination of his soul, is involved in this divine play, and it is only within this sacred playas taking a meaningful part therein -that an individual is able to gain his true freedom. The whole triad -individuality, intensity (or daimon), and fate -receives in Hegel's philosophy a spiritual determination, as the irreducibly individual foundation of the universal reality of spirit.
The human soul as Geist.
It has been said that Hegel ascribes intensity, or intensive individuality, only to the human soul.
To understand this, let us briefly consider the dividing line he draws between the human and the animal kind of soul. If the animal soul is studied in Philosophy of Nature, why attribute a special status to the human soul, one which merits the inclusion of Anthropology into Philosophy of Spirit, not Nature?
a. On the human soul's spiritual Bestimmung.
The answer may actually be derived from the inclusion itself. For Hegel, the human soul, in spite of its perceived naturalness, has an immediate spiritual determination which the animal soul lacks. Hegel (TWA 3:46) . For an interpretation, see Harris (1984: 107) . Cf. Harris (1997: 555) :
'The "Bacchic revel" is Hegel's most primitive image of "truth". In the image, we have the triumph of measure over the "boundlessness" of the Absolute as Light'. If we accept that the notion of measure is indeed presupposed in the Jena definition of truth as the 'Bacchic revel', then we cannot fail to notice how far this is from Hegel's later opinion of nature as a frivolous playground for spirit, especially as characterized by Ausgelassenheit which for Hegel means precisely the absence of measure.
(See, e.g., VPG: 6.) But cf. also Harris (1997: 122). 8 individuality is of the lowest grade, spiritually sterile, founded upon the abstract 'universal animal process ', 27 which is at the same time the biological process of genus. 28 There are only two sorts of 'fullness' or 'completeness' available to an animal individual: first, satiety, assimilation of that which is other to the animal -i.e., food -and the ensuing 'satisfaction'.
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And secondly, an animal's generic fullness, achieved by fulfilling 'the drive' to 'integrate itself'
with the genus. The drive in question begins with the 'tension' of genus in the individual, followed by a satisfaction of this tension 'in another of the same genus', out of which there emerges the 'feeling of universality', the animal's generic perfection. 30 This is 'the highest that is available to the animal': an animal cannot attain to the spiritual kind of completeness, the actualization of spirit, peculiar to the human being.
31
Spirit's 'frolicking' in nature stands thus in contrast to the 'play of Absolute Spirit with itself' (a synthesis of play and seriousness), as this play is realized by individual human souls. 32 As the animal individual stands at the center of the first type of play, the human one finds himself at the crux of the second. The empty animal soul is distinguished from the human soul, with its spiritual Bestimmung and, as a result, its distinct kind of individuality -its 'intensive form of individuality', 33 as Hegel calls it, or the soul's intensity, to the examination of which we now must turn.
The soul's intensity and daimon.
Hegel's notion of the soul's intensity owes its origin, if not its character, to Kant's criticism of rational psychology in the first Critique. In the Science of Logic, Hegel points precisely to Kant as having 'applied the determination of intensive quantity' to 'a metaphysical definition of the soul'. 34 In other words, Kant introduced the theme of the soul's intensity by attributing intensive (2003: 64-65 For the purpose of this paper, I will only point out the main defining features of Kant's notion of the soul's intensity. First, Kant does not seem to distinguish in kind between intensity of the body (mass, temperature, etc.) and intensity of the soul: both are simply quanta. This point will be important in light of Hegel's distinction between anthropological and phenomenological intensity.
Secondly, even though Kant presents his reply as an immanent criticism, one that builds upon rational psychology's own presuppositions -most importantly, the soul's simplicity and substantiality -the soul is grasped by him not as a simple substance, but as a bundle of powers (representation, consciousness, cognition, etc.) without any substantial 'centre' or 'nucleus'. In other words, whereas the 'metaphysical' proof of the soul's immortality has to do with the substantiality of the soul, Kant in his counter-argument shifts the premise of the debate from the assertion 'the soul is a simple substance' to the twofold assertion, 'the soul is a simple substance and it has a set of powers,' and then quietly drops the first part of that premise.
Accordingly, the soul's intensity is theorized by Kant not as intensity of substance, but as a kind of aggregate intensity of the soul's activities, intensity of the bundle of powers that is the soul.
The 'gradual remission of the soul's powers', 39 and the ensuing death of the soul, means here the remission of every power of the soul until the activity of each -and, consequently, the aggregate activity of the soul -reaches zero.
Finally, since the soul-substance is reduced by Kant to its 'phenomenal' aspect (its activities), without any reliance upon the 'noumenal', the notion of the soul's intensity can be justified within the transcendental framework. Kant's reply pretends to be immanent, but in fact it proceeds from within the Critical context, so that intensity of all phenomenal activity of the soul turns out to be grounded in intensity-as-form peculiar to the epistemic activity of the transcendental subject, as explicated in Kant's principle of the Anticipations of Perception. In other words, for Hegel, in our every action or relation to the world 'the last word' belongs not to our consciousness, but to the daimon, the unconscious 'totality' of the individual soul. An individual ascribes to himself, on the basis of consciousness, all kinds of 'intentions and grounds', but in reality, says Hegel, -and this becomes evident at the level of Anthropologythe 'conscious' character of such a rationalization is but a 'semblance', Schein, an unconscious self-deception. The reasons for one's actions are thus articulated retrospectively. All the local manifestations and relations of the individual are underwritten not, or not only, by one's conscious activity, but rather by the feeling 'totality' of the soul, the daimon. 49 The daimon is a 'nucleus' which is anterior to one's relations to the 'external' world and at the same time inclusive of them, 50 being, so to speak, 'excessive' over them. It is one's 'particularity' which,
12
'in all situations and relations', 'decides upon one's actions and fate' -an 'inner' 'oracle' This relation between daimon and consciousness, the totality of one's soul and the individual world of one's consciousness, between anthropological and phenomenological intensity -the relation of 'grounding' or 'determining' -is grasped by Hegel logically, in terms of the relationship between measure and quantity, as explicated in the Science of Logic.
It has been said that, in Kant, the death of the soul may be understood as an 'evanescence', a 'remission' of its intensity. In his Anthropology, Hegel also connects one's death with one's 'intensive form of individuality', and does this by assigning to the soul's intensity a certain measure. One's daimon as a 'feeling totality' 'falls under the category of being': 'the Genius has a measure' -and, 'once this measure is exceeded', the individual 'perishes'. The external and 51 Enz §405Z., TWA 10:132. 52 See Enz §395, TWA 10:70; VPG: 48ff. 53 Enz §405A., TWA 10:125. 54 See Plato, Republic, 617d-620e. 55 Enz §405Z., TWA 10:132. Cf. the epigraph to this paper from Hannah Arendt. 56 Enz §405Z., TWA 10:132. Cf. (Greene 1972: 109) .
13 foreign 'content' -'pain' -can enter and disrupt the 'unity' of one's daimon, so that the individual, says Hegel, 'can be overpowered by the inadequacy (Unangemessenheit) of that which happens to him to that which he normally is'. This inadequacy burrows deep 'into the feeling totality' of the daimon and 'explodes' its unity. 58 Besides this 'bursting' (Zerspringen), there is another way of exceeding the soul's measure. As Hegel states, the mediating consciousness may not be able to withstand the onslaught of the contradictions of which it is conscious and that threaten to destroy the measure of its intensity. In that case, death may occur in a mediated way, through one's will -the 'decision not to live any longer' 59 -so that the individual commits suicide. This was the way Cato the Younger died: he 'could not endure' the 'absolute contradiction' that entered his soul once 'the Roman republic', perfectly suited to his soul's measure, to 'his inner actuality', ceased to exist.
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Being within itself a balance of contradictions, which must not become unbalanced, 61 the soul's measure is acutely sensitive to contradictions coming from without. The destruction of one's measure is a personal kind of death: the individual is not indifferent to it. It is not death from 'the habit of living ', 62 in which an individual is absorbed without a murmur into the genus. On the contrary, the destruction of one's measure is caused by an excess of contradictions, by pain, Schmerz. It is always a violent death, experienced by the individual.
The logical distinction Hegel draws is the following one: one's intensive soul-'nucleus' has a measure, whereas intensity of consciousness possesses a 'degree', Grad, or 'intensive quantity'. 63 Logically, measure is for Hegel the unity into which quantity and quality are sublated and which serves as their truth and their ground. The category of measure not only grounds that of quantity -measure in Hegel constitutes the foundation of 'the abstract further determination of quantity' 64 peculiar to phenomenological consciousness as the realm of abstract opposition (Gegenstand) -but also incorporates it; that is why Hegel says that the soul's 'measure' is also 'quantity'. 65 In other words, Hegel does not fully reject the quantitative 16 principal direction with which 'circumstances' 'intermingle'. 83 It is nonsensical to speak of 'fortune-telling' with regard to this kind of fate. The anthropological fate is but one side of the person's actions, a particular inner Bestimmung. It has no power over the 'circumstances' outside the individual. One's fate makes itself felt when, under specific circumstances, an individual cannot do (think, feel, etc.) otherwise. The circumstances are external, but within them one behaves in accordance with his daimon and fate, so that in given circumstances he naturally does this rather than that.
b. Anthropological fate vs. other notions of fate.
The anthropological kind of fate is located at the 'nucleus' of a human individual, not outside of it. It is an inner 'oracle', not extraneous, which, however, has its last word in the way an Even 'the ancients', despite the nobility of their character which allowed them to reject the formal understanding of fate in terms of mechanical cause and effect, could not grasp fate as truly intrinsic, as one's own. For them, the recognition and acceptance of one's fate was but the acceptance of an abstract necessity lacking any connection to one's 'nucleus', one's 'particular'
being. True, 'the ancients' dismissed 'the empty talk of cause and effect' and nobly embraced the daimon and fate, to the spiritual principle of ethical life -but with an important qualification:
one's anthropological fate must not be accepted as external, but in a personal way, as 'concrete'
and 'in harmony with the particular', including every 'misfortune' that might befall the individual. 95 We should not therefore think that the modern Christian 'principle of consolation'
or 'reconciliation' is incompatible for Hegel with the ancient 'principle of fate'. 96 The principle of fate remains -at the anthropological level -whereas consolation is placed higher, at the level of spirit. What is needed is their synthesis: the modern individual must direct everything happening to him in accordance with his fate to a spiritual goal, so that even 'the negative' can be transformed into 'the affirmative'.
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But in order to do that, one must cease to regard his fate as something abstract, as a 'blind' fate, must appropriate it, 'take possession' of it, just as of the daimon, the 'feeling totality' containing one's fate. 98 This anthropological understanding of fate as enclosed within the soul's intensive core, and as that which must be put under control and directed to the goals of spirit, may be formulated in terms of intensity: the soul's individual measure of intensity must not be exhausted and destroyed in vain, must not be 'extensively' dissipated.
However, for Hegel, the modern individual tends towards precisely such an extensive waste of intensity, a neglect of the spiritual determination of his soul. To destroy 'his own valor, energy, the goals of fate' is the characteristically unworthy behavior of 'the modern man' with his 'modern capriciousness'. True, the modern individual possesses, within his soul, the internal principle of intensive subjectivity absent in the ancient world. However, such a 'depressiveness', 'fretfulness,' which also proceeds out of one's subjectivity, 'did not constitute the character of the ancients': the moderns lose their spirit too 'easily'. 'Vexation is the sentiment of the modern world'. 99 An appeal for the preservation of both fate and reconciliation is in Hegel an appeal for a synthesis of the ancient and the modern -which is already present, potentially, in the human soul possessing its intensity and fate as a result of its spiritual Bestimmung that must be directed back towards the goals of spirit.
95 TWA 17:112.
96 As does Lloyd (2008: 299-300 Hegel an affinity between the subjective and the objective, an individual path from the former to the latter:
The attitude proper to man consists in [the recognition] that he has to do with a world that is already complete (fertig) in and for itself, a might so great that he cannot damage it, but wherein he can only seek a limited sphere to participate with his own activity. The goal he attains is, on the one hand, the goal of the world which carries on by itself; on the other hand, it is a subjective goal […] It is through [this individual] undertaking (Geschäft) that the great whole, the selfexecuting work of the world, specifies itself.
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It is precisely the multiplicity of fates and strivings, of individual 'spheres', each different from another, which makes the joint 'work of the work', the complex of the Gemeinwesen possible.
103
Each 'sphere' is precisely an 'actualization' of one's 'individual world', the individual totality of one's soul. To achieve this actualization, this fulfillment of one's inner fate, one must, through 'the labor of spirit', take possession of one's individuality, participating with it in the vivere civile. 104 The necessity of consciously, not 'blindly', mastering one's soul -one's fate, daimon, intensity -is rendered in Hegel as a kind of spiritual task, a stage required for an individual to be able to attain to spirit. It is a self-cultivation, a certain spiritual and ethical attitude to one's self.
For Hegel, each individual is called to take part -an individually meaningful part -in 'the work of the world', the Gemeinwesen (res publica) of spirit, through which Absolute Spirit 'comes to itself'. Only in this way does an individual gain his freedom.
100 That Hegel argues against 'the myth of the given', is well known. Cf. Kojève's (1969: 29) Absolute Spirit -as a return gift -that it can and must be given back, as that which would individually contribute to its coming-to-itself.
Conclusion: the concretely human.
The anthropological triad -individuality, intensity (or daimon), and fate -constitutes the . 109 The problem, in other words, is that of the relation between the individual world and the common world necessary for there to be true community.
